The overall point here is not to prevent corruption, or even police it. But to use selfishness as a weapon to re-enforce meritocratic institutions.
I was having a hard time understanding til this part. I'll be thinking about it for a while in the back of my mind, thanks. I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
The purpose of corruption is to make bypassing a strict regulation easier.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Well paid soldiers, like cops, are corrupt.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
Negative reinforcement only works initially. Building an institution can only work with positive reinforcement.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Yeah, one of the benefits of a "shadow economy" is that if it's already illegal, it's unrestricted by regulation, taxation, or control. It can almost always undercut the price of an overly regulated market, and can guarantee higher personal profits for the people who involve themselves in it (so long as organized crime hasn't stepped in and taken the profits for the criminal racket).
If you've ever seen Tim Pool talk about his experience in Venezuela, you might have heard him try to buy a cellphone, but complain that he had to go through multiple bureaucrats to get approval before ever purchasing the good. Bureaucrats are a massive 'make-work' scheme by the government by people who will be loyal to their paymasters, but aren't otherwise able to find jobs. These bureaucrats are particularly vulnerable to someone "greasing the wheels" with money. If, for example, Tim Pool had handed $50 to every bureaucrat he met to buy his phone, he would have gotten it much faster. If time-sensitive materials are involved, a low paid bureaucrat is especially susceptible to corruption.
This is actually one of the reasons why the Feds allow US governments in foreign countries to keep funds specifically for bribery as long as the Feds know what's in there and who's being bought off. Some companies simply can't operate in countries without bribery for local officials. It's effectively an informal tax.
The people at the top of a political structure are also very susceptible to bribes because the stronger the regulation is, the more protected the wealthiest firms are (thereby making those firms payees for protection), and the more less wealthy firms have to 'pay-to-play'.
What all this means is that burdensome regulation and bureaucracy can actually cause corruption, just to get around it. The best way to reduce corruption, is to reduce it's cause. If you loosen and decentralize your system, you can prevent the need for bribery. if you then incentivize a meritocratic system you'll make bribery much more difficult. Instead, people will invest in successful meritocratic initiatives because it will have the best return.
If you loosen the centralization of power, you take away the need for corruption to get around it. Bribery is based on people looking for a better return on their investment. If you specify meritocracy, they'll invest in successful merit-based processes at early stages, rather than invest in a protection racket to guarantee the best return.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
I was having a hard time understanding til this part. I'll be thinking about it for a while in the back of my mind, thanks. I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
Negative reinforcement only works initially. Building an institution can only work with positive reinforcement.
Yeah, one of the benefits of a "shadow economy" is that if it's already illegal, it's unrestricted by regulation, taxation, or control. It can almost always undercut the price of an overly regulated market, and can guarantee higher personal profits for the people who involve themselves in it (so long as organized crime hasn't stepped in and taken the profits for the criminal racket).
If you've ever seen Tim Pool talk about his experience in Venezuela, you might have heard him try to buy a cellphone, but complain that he had to go through multiple bureaucrats to get approval before ever purchasing the good. Bureaucrats are a massive 'make-work' scheme by the government by people who will be loyal to their paymasters, but aren't otherwise able to find jobs. These bureaucrats are particularly vulnerable to someone "greasing the wheels" with money. If, for example, Tim Pool had handed $50 to every bureaucrat he met to buy his phone, he would have gotten it much faster. If time-sensitive materials are involved, a low paid bureaucrat is especially susceptible to corruption.
This is actually one of the reasons why the Feds allow US governments in foreign countries to keep funds specifically for bribery as long as the Feds know what's in there and who's being bought off. Some companies simply can't operate in countries without bribery for local officials. It's effectively an informal tax.
The people at the top of a political structure are also very susceptible to bribes because the stronger the regulation is, the more protected the wealthiest firms are (thereby making those firms payees for protection), and the more less wealthy firms have to 'pay-to-play'.
What all this means is that burdensome regulation and bureaucracy can actually cause corruption, just to get around it. The best way to reduce corruption, is to reduce it's cause. If you loosen and decentralize your system, you can prevent the need for bribery. if you then incentivize a meritocratic system you'll make bribery much more difficult. Instead, people will invest in successful meritocratic initiatives because it will have the best return.
If you loosen the centralization of power, you take away the need for corruption to get around it. Bribery is based on people looking for a better return on their investment. If you specify meritocracy, they'll invest in successful merit-based processes at early stages, rather than invest in a protection racket to guarantee the best return.
Yeah, that was my mistake.