A myth to help rehabilitate and reintegrate Germany after WW2. The reality was, German lives improved immensely under Nazi rule.
It's not a myth about reintegrating Germany, it's the reality of the German war machine's logistical and economic base combined with the Nazis monetary policies which were as shit as the Wiemar Republic's. There is a myth that has persisted to this day about the mechanization of the Wermacht, despite the fact that the majority of German logistics were being transported by horse. The blockades of Germany were always going to be an absolute death blow to German economy, but the Nazi plan was always to win as fast as possible, based off of sheer momentum alone, and then try to acquire as much industrial base as they could get their hands on. Part of the military's planning for the invasion of France in 1940 was the major concern that Germany simply could not defeat France in a protracted war, even without the Russians or Americans threatening. If the Germans were bogged down at any point in the invasion of France, Germany would be facing horrific logistical problems replacing the vast losses in men and material.
The German planners were wrong about their assessment of French strength, but they are absolutely accurate about German weakness. The economy never fully recovered even from WW1, let alone The Great Depression. Germany had some resources, but winning a war against France and Russia would require an impossible feat. No one really expected French morale, discipline, and command to be as absolutely broken as it was. The German performance in 1940 was only matched by the unpreparedness of the English, and the self-defeating stupidity of the French command and control structure. Hitler badly misinterpreted the Soviets experience in the Winter War and believed that Russia had demonstrated itself to be in nearly the same level of disorganized incompetence as the French, and had objectively worse equipment and training. He did not expect Stalin to adapt as quickly as he did. The purges of Stalin's military was thought to more devastating than it was because Stalin had just narrowly not executed one of the few remaining competent commanders he had left in the Army, who immediately set about re-organizing the Red Army's recruiting and organization. The experience of covert German economic support to the Soviet Union, the visible observations of Soviet movements under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and early successes in 1941 did nothing to dissuade the Germans of their initial analysis of Russia. They over-estimated France, and underestimated Russia, but they knew that a war against both was the absolute pinnacle of ambition.
By the end of the war, the manpower and resource shortfall that was absolutely obvious to everyone in 1940 had become painfully clear to everyone as resource shortages of every possible kind were prevalent in Germany, the Riech Mark was devaluing itself as the Deuch Mark had done previously, the loss of population required the importation of soldiers from puppet regimes, and the Germans were struggling to even feed themselves. Germany never had a chance to win in WW2, and the Germans knew that their Achilles heel was an economy that had never fully recovered. And anyone with a passing knowledge in economics can tell you why socialist welfare & entitlement programs don't create economic growth. What little recovery of the German economy there had been been taking place under the Wiemar government who had one competent person who was reversing their monetary policy before the Nazis took power
Most modern European welfare programs are modeled on the Nazi welfare state...
Socialist polices that were carried forward from German State Socialism & Militarism were carried forward by National Socialists, and whose programs were replicated by Fabian and Revolutionary Socialists. No shit. It's as if Socialists are Socialists.
but those who lived through it seem to have remembered it fondly, as long as they weren't Jews.
Those who lived through it remembered how insane and invasive it is, but didn't know how much had gone horribly wrong until people started to realize how much the Nazis had been lying to their faces about literally everything. Living under Nazi rule during the war was already significantly brutal, but they thought they were winning. Pre-war, Germans were never comfortable with how the Nazis conducted themselves, and they were just always told that the situation was better than their lying eyes told them.
Where the Nazis experienced actual overwhelming support was in places like Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans had faced genuine discrimination, and they were told by their socialist press that Germany was experiencing the greatest resurgence anyone had ever seen. National Socialism and Fascism was a progressive, intellectual, and modern philosophy that was touted the world over. To the Germanic-Czechs, this was all the benefits of a welfare state, with the wildest riches of a Capitalist state, and national pride of a Militarist state... right up until they let the wolf into the hen house.
That economic perfection never seemed to show up, and for some reason "National Pride" was just "Cult-like worship of Adolf Hitler".
Summer camp for kids, free healthcare, guaranteed jobs, national pride.
"Summer camp": Highly politically radicalized children who turning their parent into the Gestapo for getting pregnant at 15 or 16 to some guy because Adolf Hitler.
"Free Healthcare": Shit healthcare, as is to be expected.
"Guaranteed jobs": Forced low-paid labor into the defense industry
"National Pride": Because an Austrian-born lunatic wearing silly pants is the essence of the German nation because that guy literally said so.
It was paradise after the post-Weimar/Depression hell they'd just been through.
Initially this was because the communists were either dead of in hiding and could no longer try to burn down Berlin... again. After they got into power, the lack of any basic freedom, married with the utter lunacy of rabid socialism, did not make living in Nazi Germany even remotely present.
You tend to get lost in the weeds a lot, Giz. No one is defending socialist economics. Contemporary private correspondences and public interviews show a deliberate choice to support the Nazis in the pre-war years. And yeah, it wasn't pleasant to be a German in 44.
Contemporary private correspondences and public interviews show a deliberate choice to support the Nazis in the pre-war years.
Yes, but not by the overwhelming majority. The majority position was tolerance, and it was after they had already seized power: "The Nazis must be doing something right because they keep winning."
If the Germans were bogged down at any point in the invasion of France, Germany would be facing horrific logistical problems replacing the vast losses in men and material.
Sorry for necro'ing this one, Giz, but there's another point to this as well.
You can tell when you look at the actual German tech they went to war with that this was not a military structured around prolonged campaigns. A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimised for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals. It's also apparent in the lack of competence the German military of WWII had in providing necessary spares and equipment to return damaged vehicles to service.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind. Combine this with a US logistical train which would happily provide sufficient spares to built an entire new vehicle from parts and it's obvious which military is set up for lengthy campaigning - and had the industrial might necessary to pull this particular trick off.
You can also infer it from German practice regarding leave - for instance, during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe simply didn't grant leave - they wanted all hands to be able to prosecute their air war. The RAF, having no idea how long the engagement was going to run for and presumably reluctant to run the main line of defence into the ground, still allowed airmen leave.
A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimized for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals.
Not only that, but it seems to be a highly German conceptual problem going back to the Prussian Academies in the 1700's. They would obsess over the timing of infantry movements. Something about the German culture is autistic about order and control over disorderly things. I would argue it's actually an extension of trauma from the 30 years war, but I don't think that it's just that the German strategy was based on short war. It was, but the Germans were routinely building weapons and systems they could only maintain under the best of circumstances.
There is a problem with the German psyche somewhere.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind
Or Soviet, where maintainability was figured out by trial and error, or building for the cheapest possible result.
True, true - it's worth contrasting US and USSR production practices - the US had any number of Sherman variants but, through rigid manufacturing specifications, still had decent parts compatibility across the type, whereas the USSR, utterly focused on throughput above all else, simply shelved several improvements to the T-34 until they could fit them into the production line without interrupting the volume of tanks built.
There's also the point that the actions that made the British Firefly famous - the initial encounters with significant numbers of heavier tanks in France - the US had an equivalent tank, armed with the US 76mm - not quite as good at knocking holes in tank armour as the British 17pdr, for sure, but still more than capable of killing anything the Germans could put in front of it - but didn't bring it because the assessment was that they would not be necessary. ISTR they had 200 of the things parked up somewhere in the UK.
It's not a myth about reintegrating Germany, it's the reality of the German war machine's logistical and economic base combined with the Nazis monetary policies which were as shit as the Wiemar Republic's. There is a myth that has persisted to this day about the mechanization of the Wermacht, despite the fact that the majority of German logistics were being transported by horse. The blockades of Germany were always going to be an absolute death blow to German economy, but the Nazi plan was always to win as fast as possible, based off of sheer momentum alone, and then try to acquire as much industrial base as they could get their hands on. Part of the military's planning for the invasion of France in 1940 was the major concern that Germany simply could not defeat France in a protracted war, even without the Russians or Americans threatening. If the Germans were bogged down at any point in the invasion of France, Germany would be facing horrific logistical problems replacing the vast losses in men and material.
The German planners were wrong about their assessment of French strength, but they are absolutely accurate about German weakness. The economy never fully recovered even from WW1, let alone The Great Depression. Germany had some resources, but winning a war against France and Russia would require an impossible feat. No one really expected French morale, discipline, and command to be as absolutely broken as it was. The German performance in 1940 was only matched by the unpreparedness of the English, and the self-defeating stupidity of the French command and control structure. Hitler badly misinterpreted the Soviets experience in the Winter War and believed that Russia had demonstrated itself to be in nearly the same level of disorganized incompetence as the French, and had objectively worse equipment and training. He did not expect Stalin to adapt as quickly as he did. The purges of Stalin's military was thought to more devastating than it was because Stalin had just narrowly not executed one of the few remaining competent commanders he had left in the Army, who immediately set about re-organizing the Red Army's recruiting and organization. The experience of covert German economic support to the Soviet Union, the visible observations of Soviet movements under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and early successes in 1941 did nothing to dissuade the Germans of their initial analysis of Russia. They over-estimated France, and underestimated Russia, but they knew that a war against both was the absolute pinnacle of ambition.
By the end of the war, the manpower and resource shortfall that was absolutely obvious to everyone in 1940 had become painfully clear to everyone as resource shortages of every possible kind were prevalent in Germany, the Riech Mark was devaluing itself as the Deuch Mark had done previously, the loss of population required the importation of soldiers from puppet regimes, and the Germans were struggling to even feed themselves. Germany never had a chance to win in WW2, and the Germans knew that their Achilles heel was an economy that had never fully recovered. And anyone with a passing knowledge in economics can tell you why socialist welfare & entitlement programs don't create economic growth. What little recovery of the German economy there had been been taking place under the Wiemar government who had one competent person who was reversing their monetary policy before the Nazis took power
Socialist polices that were carried forward from German State Socialism & Militarism were carried forward by National Socialists, and whose programs were replicated by Fabian and Revolutionary Socialists. No shit. It's as if Socialists are Socialists.
Those who lived through it remembered how insane and invasive it is, but didn't know how much had gone horribly wrong until people started to realize how much the Nazis had been lying to their faces about literally everything. Living under Nazi rule during the war was already significantly brutal, but they thought they were winning. Pre-war, Germans were never comfortable with how the Nazis conducted themselves, and they were just always told that the situation was better than their lying eyes told them.
Where the Nazis experienced actual overwhelming support was in places like Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans had faced genuine discrimination, and they were told by their socialist press that Germany was experiencing the greatest resurgence anyone had ever seen. National Socialism and Fascism was a progressive, intellectual, and modern philosophy that was touted the world over. To the Germanic-Czechs, this was all the benefits of a welfare state, with the wildest riches of a Capitalist state, and national pride of a Militarist state... right up until they let the wolf into the hen house.
That economic perfection never seemed to show up, and for some reason "National Pride" was just "Cult-like worship of Adolf Hitler".
"Summer camp": Highly politically radicalized children who turning their parent into the Gestapo for getting pregnant at 15 or 16 to some guy because Adolf Hitler.
"Free Healthcare": Shit healthcare, as is to be expected.
"Guaranteed jobs": Forced low-paid labor into the defense industry
"National Pride": Because an Austrian-born lunatic wearing silly pants is the essence of the German nation because that guy literally said so.
Initially this was because the communists were either dead of in hiding and could no longer try to burn down Berlin... again. After they got into power, the lack of any basic freedom, married with the utter lunacy of rabid socialism, did not make living in Nazi Germany even remotely present.
You tend to get lost in the weeds a lot, Giz. No one is defending socialist economics. Contemporary private correspondences and public interviews show a deliberate choice to support the Nazis in the pre-war years. And yeah, it wasn't pleasant to be a German in 44.
Yes, but not by the overwhelming majority. The majority position was tolerance, and it was after they had already seized power: "The Nazis must be doing something right because they keep winning."
Sorry for necro'ing this one, Giz, but there's another point to this as well.
You can tell when you look at the actual German tech they went to war with that this was not a military structured around prolonged campaigns. A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimised for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals. It's also apparent in the lack of competence the German military of WWII had in providing necessary spares and equipment to return damaged vehicles to service.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind. Combine this with a US logistical train which would happily provide sufficient spares to built an entire new vehicle from parts and it's obvious which military is set up for lengthy campaigning - and had the industrial might necessary to pull this particular trick off.
You can also infer it from German practice regarding leave - for instance, during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe simply didn't grant leave - they wanted all hands to be able to prosecute their air war. The RAF, having no idea how long the engagement was going to run for and presumably reluctant to run the main line of defence into the ground, still allowed airmen leave.
Not only that, but it seems to be a highly German conceptual problem going back to the Prussian Academies in the 1700's. They would obsess over the timing of infantry movements. Something about the German culture is autistic about order and control over disorderly things. I would argue it's actually an extension of trauma from the 30 years war, but I don't think that it's just that the German strategy was based on short war. It was, but the Germans were routinely building weapons and systems they could only maintain under the best of circumstances.
There is a problem with the German psyche somewhere.
Or Soviet, where maintainability was figured out by trial and error, or building for the cheapest possible result.
True, true - it's worth contrasting US and USSR production practices - the US had any number of Sherman variants but, through rigid manufacturing specifications, still had decent parts compatibility across the type, whereas the USSR, utterly focused on throughput above all else, simply shelved several improvements to the T-34 until they could fit them into the production line without interrupting the volume of tanks built.
There's also the point that the actions that made the British Firefly famous - the initial encounters with significant numbers of heavier tanks in France - the US had an equivalent tank, armed with the US 76mm - not quite as good at knocking holes in tank armour as the British 17pdr, for sure, but still more than capable of killing anything the Germans could put in front of it - but didn't bring it because the assessment was that they would not be necessary. ISTR they had 200 of the things parked up somewhere in the UK.