If the Germans were bogged down at any point in the invasion of France, Germany would be facing horrific logistical problems replacing the vast losses in men and material.
Sorry for necro'ing this one, Giz, but there's another point to this as well.
You can tell when you look at the actual German tech they went to war with that this was not a military structured around prolonged campaigns. A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimised for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals. It's also apparent in the lack of competence the German military of WWII had in providing necessary spares and equipment to return damaged vehicles to service.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind. Combine this with a US logistical train which would happily provide sufficient spares to built an entire new vehicle from parts and it's obvious which military is set up for lengthy campaigning - and had the industrial might necessary to pull this particular trick off.
You can also infer it from German practice regarding leave - for instance, during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe simply didn't grant leave - they wanted all hands to be able to prosecute their air war. The RAF, having no idea how long the engagement was going to run for and presumably reluctant to run the main line of defence into the ground, still allowed airmen leave.
A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimized for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals.
Not only that, but it seems to be a highly German conceptual problem going back to the Prussian Academies in the 1700's. They would obsess over the timing of infantry movements. Something about the German culture is autistic about order and control over disorderly things. I would argue it's actually an extension of trauma from the 30 years war, but I don't think that it's just that the German strategy was based on short war. It was, but the Germans were routinely building weapons and systems they could only maintain under the best of circumstances.
There is a problem with the German psyche somewhere.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind
Or Soviet, where maintainability was figured out by trial and error, or building for the cheapest possible result.
True, true - it's worth contrasting US and USSR production practices - the US had any number of Sherman variants but, through rigid manufacturing specifications, still had decent parts compatibility across the type, whereas the USSR, utterly focused on throughput above all else, simply shelved several improvements to the T-34 until they could fit them into the production line without interrupting the volume of tanks built.
There's also the point that the actions that made the British Firefly famous - the initial encounters with significant numbers of heavier tanks in France - the US had an equivalent tank, armed with the US 76mm - not quite as good at knocking holes in tank armour as the British 17pdr, for sure, but still more than capable of killing anything the Germans could put in front of it - but didn't bring it because the assessment was that they would not be necessary. ISTR they had 200 of the things parked up somewhere in the UK.
Sorry for necro'ing this one, Giz, but there's another point to this as well.
You can tell when you look at the actual German tech they went to war with that this was not a military structured around prolonged campaigns. A lot of German kit in WWII required lengthy, expensive maintenance to perform to spec - this is not a problem in a military optimised for brief lightning strikes where you are the aggressor and so can dictate the schedule to match your maintenance timetables and just use the brief window of combat to run out your maintenance intervals. It's also apparent in the lack of competence the German military of WWII had in providing necessary spares and equipment to return damaged vehicles to service.
Compare this to, say, US equipment which was built with maintainability very much in mind. Combine this with a US logistical train which would happily provide sufficient spares to built an entire new vehicle from parts and it's obvious which military is set up for lengthy campaigning - and had the industrial might necessary to pull this particular trick off.
You can also infer it from German practice regarding leave - for instance, during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe simply didn't grant leave - they wanted all hands to be able to prosecute their air war. The RAF, having no idea how long the engagement was going to run for and presumably reluctant to run the main line of defence into the ground, still allowed airmen leave.
Not only that, but it seems to be a highly German conceptual problem going back to the Prussian Academies in the 1700's. They would obsess over the timing of infantry movements. Something about the German culture is autistic about order and control over disorderly things. I would argue it's actually an extension of trauma from the 30 years war, but I don't think that it's just that the German strategy was based on short war. It was, but the Germans were routinely building weapons and systems they could only maintain under the best of circumstances.
There is a problem with the German psyche somewhere.
Or Soviet, where maintainability was figured out by trial and error, or building for the cheapest possible result.
True, true - it's worth contrasting US and USSR production practices - the US had any number of Sherman variants but, through rigid manufacturing specifications, still had decent parts compatibility across the type, whereas the USSR, utterly focused on throughput above all else, simply shelved several improvements to the T-34 until they could fit them into the production line without interrupting the volume of tanks built.
There's also the point that the actions that made the British Firefly famous - the initial encounters with significant numbers of heavier tanks in France - the US had an equivalent tank, armed with the US 76mm - not quite as good at knocking holes in tank armour as the British 17pdr, for sure, but still more than capable of killing anything the Germans could put in front of it - but didn't bring it because the assessment was that they would not be necessary. ISTR they had 200 of the things parked up somewhere in the UK.