We can argue on the logistics of it, but war-gaming is basically how you continue a marshal society. The reason English longbowmen existed is because the King mandated that children learn how to use longbows and there would be games at festivals for everyone to practice and compete.
Basically you'd have competitive 'muck-runs', 3-gun competitions, and even competitive artillery speed drills and air-force strafing runs.
You'd have to turn Marshall prowess into a profitable sport, and that profitable sport could then be re-mobilized into standard warfare practices if the militia's need to be called up.
It doesn't annihilate the military-industrial complex, it just re-orients it so that it stops being directed at causing wars by pursuing government contracts. You can't destroy the profit motive to end war-profiteering, so you have to turn it into war-game profiteering instead.
Basically you'd have competitive 'muck-runs', 3-gun competitions, and even competitive artillery speed drills and air-force strafing runs.
These sound pretty simple to do, but I was originally thinking of something like more of a direct skirmish. Thinking about it now, though, that's basically just forcing militias to play paintball, so I'd rather go a more creative route. Like, whatever things an urban militia would need to train for are probably different from a militia whose territory includes a lot of wilderness, so you'd have different types of mock-manhunts or terrorist suppression.
You'd have to turn Marshall prowess into a profitable sport
I think I understand your point about why this would be beneficial, but I'm very wary of things getting corrupted. Taking profit out doesn't make it immune to corruption, of course, but what do you suggest for minimizing the risk of corruption in militias?
I was originally thinking of something like more of a direct skirmish. Thinking about it now, though, that's basically just forcing militias to play paintball
I think there have been historical instances of things like that, and they just devolved into actual battles.
Like, whatever things an urban militia would need to train for are probably different from a militia whose territory includes a lot of wilderness, so you'd have different types of mock-manhunts or terrorist suppression.
Right, and that would mean that each state militia could specialize in specific fields and operations.
I think I understand your point about why this would be beneficial, but I'm very wary of things getting corrupted. Taking profit out doesn't make it immune to corruption, of course, but what do you suggest for minimizing the risk of corruption in militias?
The purpose of corruption is to make bypassing a strict regulation easier. Over-stringent bureaucracy and regulation actually promotes corruption. You would basically want a system that incentives profit based on merit. Western militaries, particularly Anglo ones, are all descendant from the English "New Model Army" which explicitly focused on the importance of Meritocracy, at least within the Enlisted ranks. The Federal government, wanting cheap, but highly competent troops, would be the major enforcer of meritocratic focus. They have enormous incentives to maintain meritocracy over corruption. An incompetent, but politically appointed General, incompetently leading his own troops into disaster, is so well ingrained into the average soldier that "fragging" became a thing.
I could talk to you about the long history of political "Modern Major Generals" who are nothing beyond intellectualists & aristocrats that have no purpose on the battlefield going all the way back to Carrahe, but the fact that the enlisted ranks are prepared to execute incompetent officers says probably everything about the meritocratic focus.
So, that takes care of the external pressure to be meritocratic over corrupt. To avoid systemic corruption, the biggest factor is simply: pay. Well paid soldiers, like cops, are corrupt. Personal finance problems is one of the leading causes of corruption. Over-burdensome regulations incentivize the corruption, and poor pay & benefits nearly guarantee it.
What about internal pressures? Well, wealth, prestige, and status as an excellent niche in your particular field is critically important. Again: meritocracy over protectionism and corruption every time, and pretty much everyone is incentivized to want the highest competency in their soldiers.
There may be a threat for corruption with the feds favoring some states over others, but this is why you have to have each state excel at particular things. California might be producing great pilots, but Connecticut isn't. Instead, they need to focus on cyber-warfare.
The overall point here is not to prevent corruption, or even police it. But to use selfishness as a weapon to re-enforce meritocratic institutions.
The overall point here is not to prevent corruption, or even police it. But to use selfishness as a weapon to re-enforce meritocratic institutions.
I was having a hard time understanding til this part. I'll be thinking about it for a while in the back of my mind, thanks. I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
The purpose of corruption is to make bypassing a strict regulation easier.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Well paid soldiers, like cops, are corrupt.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
Negative reinforcement only works initially. Building an institution can only work with positive reinforcement.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Yeah, one of the benefits of a "shadow economy" is that if it's already illegal, it's unrestricted by regulation, taxation, or control. It can almost always undercut the price of an overly regulated market, and can guarantee higher personal profits for the people who involve themselves in it (so long as organized crime hasn't stepped in and taken the profits for the criminal racket).
If you've ever seen Tim Pool talk about his experience in Venezuela, you might have heard him try to buy a cellphone, but complain that he had to go through multiple bureaucrats to get approval before ever purchasing the good. Bureaucrats are a massive 'make-work' scheme by the government by people who will be loyal to their paymasters, but aren't otherwise able to find jobs. These bureaucrats are particularly vulnerable to someone "greasing the wheels" with money. If, for example, Tim Pool had handed $50 to every bureaucrat he met to buy his phone, he would have gotten it much faster. If time-sensitive materials are involved, a low paid bureaucrat is especially susceptible to corruption.
This is actually one of the reasons why the Feds allow US governments in foreign countries to keep funds specifically for bribery as long as the Feds know what's in there and who's being bought off. Some companies simply can't operate in countries without bribery for local officials. It's effectively an informal tax.
The people at the top of a political structure are also very susceptible to bribes because the stronger the regulation is, the more protected the wealthiest firms are (thereby making those firms payees for protection), and the more less wealthy firms have to 'pay-to-play'.
What all this means is that burdensome regulation and bureaucracy can actually cause corruption, just to get around it. The best way to reduce corruption, is to reduce it's cause. If you loosen and decentralize your system, you can prevent the need for bribery. if you then incentivize a meritocratic system you'll make bribery much more difficult. Instead, people will invest in successful meritocratic initiatives because it will have the best return.
If you loosen the centralization of power, you take away the need for corruption to get around it. Bribery is based on people looking for a better return on their investment. If you specify meritocracy, they'll invest in successful merit-based processes at early stages, rather than invest in a protection racket to guarantee the best return.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
We can argue on the logistics of it, but war-gaming is basically how you continue a marshal society. The reason English longbowmen existed is because the King mandated that children learn how to use longbows and there would be games at festivals for everyone to practice and compete.
Basically you'd have competitive 'muck-runs', 3-gun competitions, and even competitive artillery speed drills and air-force strafing runs.
You'd have to turn Marshall prowess into a profitable sport, and that profitable sport could then be re-mobilized into standard warfare practices if the militia's need to be called up.
It doesn't annihilate the military-industrial complex, it just re-orients it so that it stops being directed at causing wars by pursuing government contracts. You can't destroy the profit motive to end war-profiteering, so you have to turn it into war-game profiteering instead.
These sound pretty simple to do, but I was originally thinking of something like more of a direct skirmish. Thinking about it now, though, that's basically just forcing militias to play paintball, so I'd rather go a more creative route. Like, whatever things an urban militia would need to train for are probably different from a militia whose territory includes a lot of wilderness, so you'd have different types of mock-manhunts or terrorist suppression.
I think I understand your point about why this would be beneficial, but I'm very wary of things getting corrupted. Taking profit out doesn't make it immune to corruption, of course, but what do you suggest for minimizing the risk of corruption in militias?
I think there have been historical instances of things like that, and they just devolved into actual battles.
Right, and that would mean that each state militia could specialize in specific fields and operations.
The purpose of corruption is to make bypassing a strict regulation easier. Over-stringent bureaucracy and regulation actually promotes corruption. You would basically want a system that incentives profit based on merit. Western militaries, particularly Anglo ones, are all descendant from the English "New Model Army" which explicitly focused on the importance of Meritocracy, at least within the Enlisted ranks. The Federal government, wanting cheap, but highly competent troops, would be the major enforcer of meritocratic focus. They have enormous incentives to maintain meritocracy over corruption. An incompetent, but politically appointed General, incompetently leading his own troops into disaster, is so well ingrained into the average soldier that "fragging" became a thing.
I could talk to you about the long history of political "Modern Major Generals" who are nothing beyond intellectualists & aristocrats that have no purpose on the battlefield going all the way back to Carrahe, but the fact that the enlisted ranks are prepared to execute incompetent officers says probably everything about the meritocratic focus.
So, that takes care of the external pressure to be meritocratic over corrupt. To avoid systemic corruption, the biggest factor is simply: pay. Well paid soldiers, like cops, are corrupt. Personal finance problems is one of the leading causes of corruption. Over-burdensome regulations incentivize the corruption, and poor pay & benefits nearly guarantee it.
What about internal pressures? Well, wealth, prestige, and status as an excellent niche in your particular field is critically important. Again: meritocracy over protectionism and corruption every time, and pretty much everyone is incentivized to want the highest competency in their soldiers.
There may be a threat for corruption with the feds favoring some states over others, but this is why you have to have each state excel at particular things. California might be producing great pilots, but Connecticut isn't. Instead, they need to focus on cyber-warfare.
The overall point here is not to prevent corruption, or even police it. But to use selfishness as a weapon to re-enforce meritocratic institutions.
I was having a hard time understanding til this part. I'll be thinking about it for a while in the back of my mind, thanks. I basically started slipping into a stance of pushing negative reinforcement when I know only positive reinforcement works.
I hadn't thought of it like this.
Also I assume you meant underpaid instead of well paid here.
Negative reinforcement only works initially. Building an institution can only work with positive reinforcement.
Yeah, one of the benefits of a "shadow economy" is that if it's already illegal, it's unrestricted by regulation, taxation, or control. It can almost always undercut the price of an overly regulated market, and can guarantee higher personal profits for the people who involve themselves in it (so long as organized crime hasn't stepped in and taken the profits for the criminal racket).
If you've ever seen Tim Pool talk about his experience in Venezuela, you might have heard him try to buy a cellphone, but complain that he had to go through multiple bureaucrats to get approval before ever purchasing the good. Bureaucrats are a massive 'make-work' scheme by the government by people who will be loyal to their paymasters, but aren't otherwise able to find jobs. These bureaucrats are particularly vulnerable to someone "greasing the wheels" with money. If, for example, Tim Pool had handed $50 to every bureaucrat he met to buy his phone, he would have gotten it much faster. If time-sensitive materials are involved, a low paid bureaucrat is especially susceptible to corruption.
This is actually one of the reasons why the Feds allow US governments in foreign countries to keep funds specifically for bribery as long as the Feds know what's in there and who's being bought off. Some companies simply can't operate in countries without bribery for local officials. It's effectively an informal tax.
The people at the top of a political structure are also very susceptible to bribes because the stronger the regulation is, the more protected the wealthiest firms are (thereby making those firms payees for protection), and the more less wealthy firms have to 'pay-to-play'.
What all this means is that burdensome regulation and bureaucracy can actually cause corruption, just to get around it. The best way to reduce corruption, is to reduce it's cause. If you loosen and decentralize your system, you can prevent the need for bribery. if you then incentivize a meritocratic system you'll make bribery much more difficult. Instead, people will invest in successful meritocratic initiatives because it will have the best return.
If you loosen the centralization of power, you take away the need for corruption to get around it. Bribery is based on people looking for a better return on their investment. If you specify meritocracy, they'll invest in successful merit-based processes at early stages, rather than invest in a protection racket to guarantee the best return.
Yeah, that was my mistake.