(I will probably make this my last word on the subject if you want to have one last response, but I think there is not a lot extra to talk about on the topic. I did enjoy it though)

I feel like I'm talking to Peter Zeihan or a Zeihgeist

Kind of? I will admit that I do listen to him, and I think it is worth it because he did call a lot of stuff long before it happened, so he at least has an idea. But I dont take his word as gospel, because he has also had moments being wrong, as well as moments of being wildly wrong.

It is more that I listen to him, and if it doesnt have actual data to back up what he is saying (generally anything outside of economics), then I go looking for new info based on what he said rather than just taking him at his word. Since we are on the note, my other big Geopolitical sources are George Freidman and Chris Chappell (China Uncensored/America Uncovered), as well as minor sources.

Soledar

Good to know. Admittedly, while I considered Bakhmut as something Ukraine could win, but once it turned into an artillery slog, that is something the Russians have at least been somewhat successful at.

You posit that the Russians aren't the Soviets. I posit the Ukrainians aren't the Germans.

My main point though was that it doesnt matter if Russia has 10 million soldiers if they cant get into the fight at a rate faster than Ukraine can kill them. You are right, the core Ukrainian forces are effectively "Babies First NATO-army" with the territorials being slightly better armed militamen (with all of the positives and negatives that implies), but if Russian logistics are so bad their soldiers cant get to the fight, or are combat ineffective when they do, it doesnt matter.

That is honestly one of the biggest differences between Russia 1917 and Russia 1945. Both had severe logistical issues in their wars. The Soviets early in Barbarossa were losing to the Germans, even while outnumbering them, due to said supply issues. Then when they entered Lend Lease, and the Americans started throwing trucks and trains at them, it allowed the Soviets to start actually moving their men and their gear, and is pretty much the only reason Deep Battle as a doctrine worked (and Zhukov admitted as much frequently, to the annoyance of Stalin).

Now Russia wants to do Deep Battle, but they have been snorting their own supply of "We Won the Great Patriotic War with no help!" for so long, they forgot about their own logistic issues that were never really solved in the time since the 1950's. This is also before we get to the fact that this is not the Russia of the Soviet era, and their population is probably not up for a continued, protracted war. The mass fleeing in the face of the last round of [partial] mobilization proves that, and I dont see how a second round will change that. In fact, it may make it worse.

And the complete removal of Russia as a geopolitical enemy in our lifetime? Okay Zeihan, calm down

To be fair, I still foresee them being a major threat, especially as long as they have their nuclear stockpile. My point was that I just think this war has well and truly place Russia below China on the "Threats to America" list, and barring something coming out of left field, I dont see that changing.