Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them. It used to be mostly Russian, now is almost 100% Chechen. A few people in mixed marriages (not many of these) and that's about it.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them. It used to be mostly Russian, now is almost 100% Chechen. A few people in mixed marriages (not many of these) and that's about it. They rebuilt the Grozny Church (it was the only one is the Soviet era Grozny, just like these was only 1 mosque during this era, and was bombed by Russia during Yeltsin's Orthodox Christmas "ceasefire" in January 1994) and it's completely empty all the time.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them. It used to be mostly Russian, now is almost 100% Chechen. A few people in mixed marriages (not many of these) and that's about it. They rebuilt the Grozny cathedral (bombed by Russia during Yeltsin's Orthodox Christmas "ceasefire" in January 1994) and it's completely empty all the time.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them. It used to be mostly Russian, now is almost 100% Chechen. A few people in mixed marriages (not many of these) and that's all.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them. It used to be mostly Russian, now is almost 100% Chechen.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are practically no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or just died of old age since with no one replacing them.
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Some deja vu:
Rather than cultivate relationships and establish a viable HumInt network prior to and during the hostilities, Russian arrogance alienated the various city and village populaces. Initially, the majority of the Chechen population appeared willing to negotiate their status with the new Russian Government. Many were disenchanted with Dudayev and would likely have supported prudent opposition efforts. Instead of fostering this disenchantment, the Russians employed tactics such as carpet bombing and massed artillery strikes that convinced the Chechens that the Russian military was their biggest enemy. The Russians also misused another potential HumInt source by failing to establish a network among the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians who lived in Grozny. Instead, indiscriminate Russian fires also alienated the “Russo-Chechens” in the region. Russian intelligence personnel could have better employed these citizens to gather information on the Chechen forces. They may also have been motivated to assist in removing the separatist government, since Dudayev’s regime was particularly unpopular with them prior to the invasion.
The end result is there are literally no ethnic Russians in Grozny today. They either got killed or left, or died of old age since (the ones that didn't leave).
Here's an article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Here's one recent article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in an island near the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Here's one recent article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in Margaret island in the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executed, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Here's one recent article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in Margaret island in the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executef, and buried somewhere in a garbage dump).
Here's one recent article mentioning the Grozny coup attempt by the "not Russian soldiers" in a greater context: https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/02/russias-1994-96-campaign-for-chechnya-a-failure-in-shaping-the-battlespace.html
There it was a total disaster, unlike the total success in Crimea (and the so much more violent and ruthless one in Kabul 1979), and was soon followed a demonstration of force" invasion that was supposed to look like the one in Czechoslovakia 1968 with the same effect.
They also excepted something like Czechoslovakia 1968, maybe Hungary 1956 at most (practically only Budapest resisted and not for long, and mostly with the "fascist" militias not regular soldiers) when invading Ukraine in 2022. Instead they got a bigger and worse Chechnya.
There was some regular resistance in Budapest, including in Margaret island in the center of the city where some soldiers held out even after Nagy himself surrendered (the Soviets and their collaborators later had Nagy executef, and buried somewhere in a garbage dumo).